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1 This paper is forthcoming in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy.   2
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, while life expectancy has increased, there has been a near-
universal trend across OECD countries towards earlier retirement (see Blöndal and 
Scarpetta, 1999).  Among the explanations for falling activity rates among older 
workers are the disincentive effects created by social security and pension systems2 
and the relative disadvantage of older workers during a period of industrial re-
structuring and technological change,3 as well as rising levels of wealth which have 
afforded individuals a longer period in retirement.   
The decline in the proportion of life spent working is even more pronounced when 
one considers that, as retirement ages have fallen, the age at which individuals finish 
full-time education has typically increased.  This is shown in Table 1 for different 
cohorts in the UK.  On average, the 1900 cohort spent 69% of their total life in the 
labour market, compared to 59% for the 1935 cohort. 4 If retirement ages for 
subsequent cohorts stay at their current level then this proportion would fall to 53% 
for the cohort born in 1980.    
The current policy debate in the UK, as in many other countries, is about how to raise 
the effective age of retirement (the age at which people leave the labour market) and 
whether to raise the age at which people become eligible for a pension from the state.  
In some countries, there is pressure for an increase in the state pension age in 
response to large projected increases in public spending on pensions.5  In the UK, 
state spending on pensions is projected to grow by much less than in other 
                                                 
2 See Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and Gruber and Wise (2002) 
3 Banks and Casanova (2004) present evidence on the decline of relative real wages of older 
workers (particularly the low-skilled) in the UK. 
4 These calculations are crude for a number of reasons mainly to do with the need to aggregate 
different types of individual and population data to the cohort level in order to make the 
comparisons. Key isues are that they refer to the proportion of life in the labour market for 
those that actually living to retirement age (more of an issue for the earlier cohorts than the 
later ones) and that they do not strictly decompose due to the use of mean school leaving age 
and median retirement age. 
5 Several countries (including the UK, Austria, Hungary and Switzerland) are introducing 
increases in the state pension age for women, to bring it in line with that of men.  The pension 
age for men and women was raised from 60 to 65 in New Zealand between 1992-2001, having 
been reduced from 65 in 1977.  Japan is raising its pension age from 60 to 65 between 2013 
and 2025.  The US is raising its standard pension age from 65 to 67 between 2000-2022.  
Italy is raising the number of years’ pension coverage to 39 years in 2006 and to 40 years in 
2009.  Finland and Denmark are both reducing the minimum pension age, but tightening up 
eligibility for early retirement, with the overall aim of increasing the effective retirement age.     3
countries;6 but an increase in the state pension age has been suggested as one way of 
financing an increase in the state pension’s generosity.   
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p = 0.59 
             
1900  14.1  65  73.5  0.69  -  - 
1910  14.6  65  74.0  0.68  -  - 
1920  14.8  63  74.5  0.65  -  - 
1930  15.2  62  75.5  0.62  -  - 
1935  15.9  61  76.7  0.59  -  - 
             
1940  16.1  -  77.5  -  0.58  61.8 
1950  16.8  -  79.5  -  0.56  63.7  
1960  17.2  -  80.9  -  0.54  64.9 
1970  17.7  -  81.7  -  0.53  65.9 
1980  17.8  -  82.2  -  0.53  66.3 
             
Source:  Age left school and retirement age calculated using data from the Family 
Expenditure Survey.  Data on life-expectancy from ONS Population Trends (2004). 
 
Note: Cohorts are five-year cohorts beginning with listed year (so 1900 refers to the cohort 
1900-1904 etc.) 
 
A desire to raise the effective retirement age is motivated by a wider concern about 
the economic dependency ratio, ie the relative numbers of economically productive to 
economically dependent individuals.7  This, rather than population ageing per se, is 
what matters for the financial solvency of pensions and other welfare systems (as well 
as being a key determinant of economic growth8).  With an increase in labour force 
participation among older workers, available labour resources will continue to grow, 
even with an ageing population.   
 
                                                 
6 The decision to link the basic state pension to prices not earnings from 1981 and successive 
reforms to the second-tier state pension have reduced the generosity of the state pension 
relative to earnings.  Since 1999, there has been increased spending on means-tested benefits 
for pensioners.    
7  or more precisely the total production of the active to the total costs of support of the 
inactive 
8 The OECD recently concluded that unless there is a substantial increase in labour force 
participation, especially among older workers, available labour resources will remain broadly 
stagnant over the next 50 years, implying labour shortages and a pronounced slowdown in 
economic growth.   4
And, while raising the age at which people become eligible to receive a pension from 
the state is likely to have an impact on effective retirement ages, it may be neither 
necessary – if there are other barriers to economic activity of older workers – nor 
sufficient – if people rely on private pensions or other, non-pension, state benefits to 
finance their early retirement – for such a change to occur.  Understanding 
retirement, and the nature and determinants of economic activity at older ages more 
broadly, will therefore be one of the keys to countries’ transitions to their new socio-
demographic and economic equilibria in the face of population ageing.  
In this paper we consider the nature and timing of retirement in the UK and discuss 
how we might expect future trends to evolve.  Like other OECD countries, the UK 
experienced more than two decades of declining labour market activity among older 
men in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s.  While employment rates among older 
women remained fairly constant, this contrasted with an increase in participation at 
younger ages.9  Several measures have already been introduced in an attempt to 
reverse this trend including tighter eligibility for disability benefits (from 1995), in-
work benefits and training incentives targeted at the 50+ unemployed (from 2002) 
and the abolition of mandatory early retirement and age discrimination (from 
October 2006).  An increase in the state pension age from 65 to 68 has been recently 
proposed by the independent Pensions Commission.10  Recent evidence suggests that 
labour market activity rates are rising, perhaps in response to some of these 
measures, and/or reflecting the relatively strong performance of the economy. 11 
Retirement decisions are the outcome of individual choice and institutional context.  
In the UK, the institutional context is characterized by a high level of private pension 
provision, compared to many other countries.  For recent cohorts of retirees, this has 
typically meant employer-provided defined benefit schemes (occupational pensions), 
which have often facilitated and encouraged early retirement.  Future cohorts of 
retirees will increasingly be reliant on individual defined contribution pensions 
(personal or stakeholder pensions) and, for them, the opportunities and incentives to 
retire early may be quite different.  In the UK, most people with a private (DB or DC) 
pension choose to opt out of the second, earnings-related tier of the state pension 
system; for them, the state pension is a fairly minimal, flat rate pension and the 
incentives in their private pension are likely to matter far more for their retirement.  
                                                 
9 See Tanner (1996), and Disney (1999) 
10 This was an independent body set up to review pensions arrangements in the UK. 
11 Banks and Blundell (2005)   5
The UK may therefore offer important insights into how labour market outcomes 
may turn out under systems with more private and individual pension provision.   
What emerges from the analysis is that, among current retirees, there are distinct 
groups with very different retirement experiences (see Figure 1).  At the top of the 
wealth distribution individuals retire early, typically drawing an income from an 
occupational pension before age 65; at the bottom of the wealth distribution 
individuals are even more likely to be not working in their 50s, yet typically do not 
define themselves as retired and are supported by income support, or more usually, 
disability benefits.  Policy-makers keen to raise effective retirement ages will need to 
keep in mind the very different circumstances and needs of these groups. 
Figure 1: Labour market inactivity of older men,  
















Source: Banks and Casanova (2004) calculations from English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, 
Wave 1 (2002) 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section discusses what retirement is, 
and looks at evidence on the nature of individuals’ transitions into retirement, 
including when people typically retire, their employment prior to retirement and 
whether there is evidence of partial or gradual retirement.  Section III focuses on the 
influence of pensions on retirement and section IV discusses mandatory retirement 
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II. WHAT IS RETIREMENT? 
Any discussion of retirement is complicated by the problem of defining when 
retirement occurs, and the prior problem of defining what retirement is.  Broadly, the 
concept of retirement may embody a number of different elements, to differing 
degrees:12 
•  complete and permanent withdrawal from employment;  
•  receipt of income from a state or private pension; and 
•  a state of mind, i.e. the individual perceives themselves to be retired.   
A purely subjective definition of retirement has the potential drawback that being 
retired may mean different things to different people and more importantly to 
different groups of the population.  But, understanding an individual’s expectations 
about their current and future employment status is likely to be important for 
understanding their life-cycle decisions, i.e. their current and future consumption 
and savings behaviour. From the perspective of the Life Cycle Model of consumption 
and leisure,  individuals’ expectations about their future labour market participation 
and future income will affect their current consumption behaviour, and individuals’ 
preferences for future consumption will affect their desired future labour market 
participation (see Heckman (1974), for example).  
The concept of retirement adopted by most economists modelling retirement13 
typically has the following characteristics:  
•  it is synonymous with drawing a pension; 
•  it is a sudden, rather than a gradual, process and encompasses the decision 
whether to work at all, rather than the decision of how many hours to work; 
•  it is an absorbing (ie permanent) state; 
•  it is an individual decision rather than one made jointly with other household 
members; and 
•  it is a voluntary choice, albeit made subject to opportunities and constraints 
presented by employers and pension arrangements. 
                                                 
12 For further discussion of what retirement is, see Fields and Mitchell (1984), Lazear (1986) 
and Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) 
13 Of course, there are exceptions, including Rust and Phelan (1997) who model the labour 
force participation separately from the decision to draw a pension, Berkovec and Stern (1991) 
who allow retirement to be gradual and Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) who model joint 
retirement decisions.  See Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) for a review.   7
In this section we examine the extent to which retirement conforms in reality to this 
stylized version of the models.14  In many cases, the three events (stopping work, 
beginning to draw a pension and considering yourself to have become retired) do not 
occur simultaneously.  Some people consider themselves to be retired, but are still 
working, others have left work never to return, but do not yet consider themselves 
retired; some people are drawing a pension but still working, while others are retired, 
but yet to draw a pension.       
Yet, despite the variety of options available, this section will show that the diversity in 
retirement behaviour, particularly for men, is not as great as it potentially might be.  
Broadly, there are two distinct groups.  In one, individuals retire before age 65, 
typically drawing an income from an occupational pension; in the other, typically less 
well-qualified individuals are even more likely to be not working in their 50s, yet 
typically do not define themselves as retired on exit from the labour market and are 
supported by income support, or more usually, disability benefits.  Within both 
groups, retirement appears to be fairly sudden rather than gradual and, for the 
overwhelming majority, an absorbing state.  In later sections we consider how these 
dominant patterns reflect the institutional context   
When do people retire? 
Whichever definition is used - exit from employment, drawing a pension, or self-
assessed retirement status – the majority of men, and many women, retire before the 
state pension age of 65 for men and 60 for women (Table 2).  These are the most 
common retirement ages for men and women, but 66% of men and 55% of women 
stop working before this age, 62% of men consider themselves to be retired before 
they reach 65, and 65% of men have started drawing a pension by then. 
                                                 
14 The data are taken from the British Household Panel Survey – full details are given in the 
Annex.   8 
Table 2: Average retirement ages 












retiring at that 
age) 
Age of retirement  62  65 (20.3%)  60  60 (16.9%) 
Age of stopping work  61  65 (13.0%)  58  60 (10.2%) 
Age of drawing pension  61  65 (27.5%)  60  60 (43.3%) 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2003 
 
For just over half of men and one-third of women, the three retirement ages coincide: 
The age at which they stop working is the same as the age at which they start drawing 
a pension and the age at which they consider themselves to be retired.  In other cases, 
people stop working before they retire, moving into retirement via another non-
working state; they also retire before they start to draw a pension, using other early 
retirement vehicles, particularly disability benefits.  Below, we explore these cases 
further. 
Is retirement synonymous with labour market exit? 
While the majority of men retire from employment, around 40% of men move into 
self-assessed retirement from another non-working state, usually unemployment or 
long-term sick/disabled.  This is particularly the case among those with low levels of 
qualifications, as shown in Figure 2 below.  For those with higher qualifications (33% 
of the sample), leaving employment is much more likely to be synonymous with self-
assessed retirement.  For those with no qualifications (34% of the sample), levels of 
non-employment are quite high, even among people in their 40s.  But early 
retirement is less usual.  Instead, those in this group who leave employment are more 
likely to say that they are unemployed or long-term sick/ disabled.  For those with no 
qualifications, there is a far greater transition to self-assessed retirement at age 65. 15  
Smith (2006) shows that moving into retirement from another non-employment 
state is not just a question of terminology, but may indicate earlier than anticipated 
retirement as a result of ill-health and/or redundancy, and is associated with a fall in 
                                                 
15 There is a third group with school qualification whose behaviour is intermediate between 
the higher and lower education groups.   9
spending at retirement that suggests a negative shock to wealth through lost earnings 
and/or additions to pension.  
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Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2003 
 
Is retirement synonymous with drawing a pension? 
Around one-quarter of men stop working before they start to draw a state or private 
pension.  Instead, unemployment benefits, income support or, more commonly, 
disability benefits, form alternative early retirement vehicles.  Again, there are 
interesting differences by education – the better qualified are much more likely to 
draw on a private pension if they retire before 65, while those with no qualifications 
are more likely to rely on disability benefits.  Although around two-thirds of those 
with no qualifications do eventually receive some income from a private pension, they 
are much more likely than those with higher qualifications to start drawing it at age 
65; the better-educated are more likely to start drawing their pension earlier (see 
Table 3).   10
Table 3: Proportion receiving different income sources, by education 
(non-working only) 
  Unemployment 
benefit/ Income 
support 
Disability benefits  Private pension income 
  Qualifications  Qualifications  Qualifications 
Age  Higher  None  Higher  None  Higher  None 
50-54  0.20  0.40  0.49  0.81  0.54  0.17 
55-59  0.09  0.27  0.33  0.72  0.72  0.32 
60-64  0.07  0.27  0.28  0.61  0.84  0.51 
65-69  0.02  0.10  0.10  0.27  0.90  0.67 
Note: Higher qualifications include degree, teaching, nursing or other higher qualification 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2003 
 
So, stopping work is not synonymous with drawing a pension and it is certainly not 
synonymous with drawing a state pension.  Only 7% of men stop working at 65 and 
draw only a state pension at this age.  The direct effect of any increase in the state 
pension age on retirement is therefore likely to be fairly small.  Of course, the impact 
may be bigger if there are indirect effects on the normal pension ages in occupational 
schemes and if the state pension age provides a social norm for people with 
individual DC pension plans.  On the other hand, the continuing availability of 
alternative early retirement vehicles may reduce the direct impact of raising the state 
pension age if more people move onto disability benefit or income support.16 
Is retirement gradual? 
The evidence suggests that, for the great majority of people, retirement is not a 
gradual process of labour market withdrawal, but instead involves a fairly abrupt 
transition from full-time employment to zero hours.   In the run-up to retirement, the 
proportion of men working part-time doubles (this increase is fairly concentrated 
between five – seven years from stopping work), but part-time workers still comprise 
no more than 10% of the total.17      
                                                 
16 If reforms maintained same expected value of state pension income, the effect of raising the 
age at which people become eligible to receive it would raise retirement age for those affected 
only if they are liquidity constrained, but this is likely to be true for most in the affected group. 
17 This evidence is in contrast to the experience in the US where Ruhm (1990) suggests that 
partial retirement is common.   11










































































Graphs by sex 
 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2003 
 
The cliff-edge nature of retirement is evident from Figure 3, which shows average 
hours worked per week, with and without overtime, in the run up to retirement.18  
Over the decade before retirement, there is a seven-hour drop in average total weekly 
hours worked by men.  A fall of around two hours is attributable to a reduction in 
overtime hours worked; around three hours is due to the increase in part-time work; 
while, among those who work full-time, the number of hours worked (excluding 
overtime) falls by a further two hours.  But, this slight fall in average weekly hours is 
as nothing compared to the huge drop that occurs when people retire.  It is a similar 
story for women, although the drop is slightly less steep because of the higher 
proportion who work part-time.   There is very little increase in the proportion of 
women working part-time in the run-up to retirement. 
If there are diminishing marginal returns to leisure, there is clearly an issue about 
whether such a discrete change is optimal from the individual’s point of view.  There 
are a number of possible reasons why individuals may not want to reduce their hours 
gradually, including fixed costs associated with working and/or economies of scale in 
converting time into utility-producing leisure.  They may also face constraints in their 
choice of the number of hours to work as a result of the fixed costs of employment to 
                                                 
18 Note that this is not a balanced panel – the sample observed ten years before retirement is 
not the same as the sample observed nine years before retirement, and so on.   12
the employer – although the higher proportion of women who work part-time 
suggests that more men could work part-time if they wanted to, although possibly not 
in the same job or for the same employer.  For people with a defined benefit 
occupational pension, the fact that pension depends on final salary and the current 
legal restrictions on drawing any pension income while still working for the same 
employer19 may also act as barriers to part-time working.   We return to these issues 
in the next section. 
Is retirement permanent? 
The evidence suggests that for most people, retirement is an absorbing state.  
Looking at the four waves after someone first retires (according to their self-assessed 
retirement status), 11% of men and 7% of women return to work at some time during 
this period.  This means that more than 90% of people who retire, appear to stay 
retired. 20 
Is retirement an individual or household decision? 
Retirement has most commonly been analysed as an individual rather than a joint 
household decision (for exceptions see Hurd, 1988, and Gustman and Steinmeier, 
2004) although this is mainly for reasons of analytic and computational simplicity.  
There are several reasons for thinking that retirement might be determined jointly, 
however, including: complementarity of leisure, correlated preferences, caring 
responsibilities in the presence of health shocks, or common income/wealth effects.  
However, evidence from the BHPS suggests that the simultaneous retirement of 
husbands and wives is relatively uncommon.21  In the BHPS sample, for example, 
around 10% of people stop working at the same time as their partner, and a further 
10% retire one year before/ after their partner.  Looking at the reasons for retiring 
early (see Table 5 below), only 3% say that it was in order to retire at the same time as 
their partner, although 7% retired early because of other’s ill-health and 8% retired 
early to spend more time with their family, suggesting that consideration may be 
given not just to leisure time or caring responsibilities with respect to a partner, but 
also children, grandchildren and possibly parents.  These factors are much more 
                                                 
19 due to be abolished in April 2006 
20 Again, the US experience appears somewhat different to this.  Ruhm (1990) suggests that 
25% of people who retire re-enter the labour force. 
21 Although, of course, retirement decisions may be made jointly even if retirements are not 
simultaneous.   13
important for women than for men22 – accounting for 30% of early retirements for 
women compared with 7% for men.   
III. THE EFFECT OF PENSIONS ON RETIREMENT 
A number of studies have shown that the timing and nature of retirement are 
influenced by state and private pension arrangements, and by the availability of other 
benefits as alternative early retirement vehicles.23  Gruber and Wise (2004) bring 
together individual micro-econometric studies of retirement across a number of 
countries which, despite unique pension arrangements, cultures and labour market 
institutions, share the following common responses to pension incentives: 
•  A positive wealth effect – the higher someone’s total pension wealth (and 
other financial wealth), the more likely they are to retire; 
•  A negative accrual effect – the more that someone can increase their total 
pension wealth by delaying their retirement, the less likely they are to retire;  
•  The independent effect of eligibility ages – while pension accrual typically 
turns negative after someone becomes eligible for a pension, providing an 
incentive to retire, a common finding across a number of countries studies is 
that the pure economic incentive effects cannot explain the observed levels of 
retirement at these ages.  One explanation is that eligibility ages may act as 
social norms, with people viewing them as appropriate or acceptable 
retirement ages.  Another possible explanation is that people may be liquidity 
constrained and unable to retire before they become eligible to receive 
pension income, even if it is “optimal” for them to retire earlier.24   
In the UK, the majority of people have a private defined benefit (occupational) or 
defined contribution (personal or stakeholder) pension.  As the table below shows, 
occupational pensions are more common among older workers; the closure of many 
employer defined benefit pensions, usually to new entrants, is gradually reducing 
coverage, particularly among younger workers.  The UK, like the US, is experiencing a 
shift in private pension provision from DB to DC, although younger workers are also 
much more likely to have no private pension.  Most of those with a private 
                                                 
22 This is consistent with evidence from the US showing that women’s retirement is affected 
by their husbands’ pension arrangements, but that the same is not true for men (see Coile, 
2004).  
23 See for example, Fields and Mitchell (19884), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), Samwick 
(1998)  
24 People cannot typically borrow against future state pension income.   14
(occupational or personal) pension are likely to have contracted out of the second, 
earnings-related state pension scheme.  In this case, their state pension is a fairly 
minimal, flat rate pension and the incentives in their private pension are likely to 
matter far more for their retirement.  This section looks at the retirement incentive 
effects associated with occupational pension schemes and discusses the possible 
effect on retirement of a shift to private pension schemes.      
Table 4: Private pension coverage, men and women 








Employer pension  67.9%  52.9%  45.3%  50.3% 
Personal pension  40.9%  39.8%  25.1%  26.4% 
Both  27.0%  24.2%  16.0%  18.5% 
Neither  17.7%  31.5%  45.6%  41.8% 
Note: Employer pension defined by whether someone is currently a member of their 
employer’s pension scheme and/or is receiving a pension from a former employer.  Personal 
pension is defined by whether someone is contributing to a personal pension and/or is 
receiving a private pension or annuity.25 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2003 
Retirement and defined benefit pensions 
In the UK, DB occupational pensions plan typically ‘guarantee’26 a final pension that 
depends on length of service and final salary.  By continuing to work, someone with a 
DB scheme can increase the value of their final pension and lump sum by increasing 
their years’ service and increasing the final salary on which their pension is based.27  
This provides an incentive to stay in work.  Beyond the normal retirement age, 
however, (and once they have a full service record, typically 40 years) someone will 
lose one year’s pension for each year that they delay retirement.  There may be an 
opportunity to increase the value of the pension by deferring, but deferral rates are 
typically not actuarially fair.  By contrast, many schemes offer generous options for 
early retirement before the normal pension age, after which accrual is often negative.  
                                                 
25 .  In most cases, the employer’s pension will be a DB occupational pension scheme, but 
some (particularly younger) workers, may have an employer DC pension or even a Group 
Personal Pension (a collection of individual  DC private pensions organised at the employer 
level).  The fairly high proportion who are observed to have both will include some people 
who, at some time, have been in an employer’s pension and a personal pension, some people 
who belong to a GPP and some people who make free standing additional voluntary 
contributions to their occupational pension. 
26 There is employment risk and, until 2005 and the introduction of a Pension Protection 
Fund, prudential risk since there was no payout in the event of the employer going bankrupt.   
27 This second element matters more for workers with higher levels of education who 
experience more earnings’ growth over their lifetimes and in later years.     15
Beyond the normal or early retirement age, therefore, there is a strong incentive to 
retire.   
DB pensions have a strong effect on the timing of retirement since they provide an 
incentive for people to work in their 40s and 50s and retire once they have reached 
the normal or early retirement age in their scheme – see Blundell et al (2002) for 
evidence.  DB pensions have a big role to play in explaining at least some of the fall in 
retirement ages in the UK.  Not only did increased coverage of occupational pensions 
act as a positive wealth effect, but in the late 1980s and early 1990s, generous early 
retirement windows, funded by pension surpluses, were used by many employers to 
downsize workforces (see Disney, 1999).  
In principle, DB pensions may also affect the gradual/ discrete nature of retirement.  
Because pension depends on final salary, there is a penalty for reducing the number 
of hours worked in the run-up to drawing your pension, at least if you want to stay in 
the same job.  In fact, the incentive is to increase the number of hours worked in the 
run up to retirement in order to achieve the highest possible final salary.  Also, until 
April 2006, there is a legal constraint on someone drawing a pension and continuing 
to work for the same employer, a further barrier to partial retirement.   
In the BHPS data, those who currently belong to an employer’s pension are less likely 
to shift into part-time work (for the reasons outlined above), but those who have a 
pension from a previous employer are actually three times more likely to work part-
time before retirement than those who have never belonged to an employer’s pension 
scheme.  This suggests that earlier pension ages in employer pensions may actually 
facilitate part-time work, by providing an income to supplement earnings from part-
time employment, compared to people who rely on the state pension.  Those with no 
private pension income or other financial wealth are likely to be more constrained in 
their ability to work part-time before the state pension age since other (non-private) 
early retirement vehicles, income support and disability benefit, do not allow people 
to combine part-time work with drawing an income.28 
                                                 
28 The over-50s earnings tax credit, introduced in 2003, does provide in-work benefits to 
anyone working 16 hours a week or more, but is only available to those who have been out of 
work for more than 6 months.   16
Retirement and defined contribution pensions 
Defined contribution schemes offer different incentives for retirement at different 
ages.29  Compared to a DB scheme, there are less strongly defined incentives to retire 
at particular ages in a DC scheme – contracted out rebates cease at age 65 and 
annuity rates and mortality rates both vary by age, but none of these will generate 
such sharp kinks in accrual profiles as are typically found in DB schemes.  The main 
incentive for someone to delay retirement in a DC scheme is the potential increase in 
the value of their pension fund – through another year’s return on the accumulated 
fund as well as additional contributions from the state (through contracting out) or 
their employer – and a higher annuity rate since the individual will be one year older 
when they annuitise.  However, against this increase must be offset the loss of one 
year’s annuity income,30 the loss from postponing the pension and lump sum31 and 
any risk in annuity rates and investment returns.  With no early/ normal retirement 
ages in a DC scheme, someone can continue to increase the value of their pension, 
even at older ages – and this reduces the incentive to retire, compared to most DB 
schemes.  But, DB schemes typically have a stronger incentive to delay retirement – 
and stay in work – until the early/ normal retirement age.   
The profile of retirement ages is likely to be smoother under DC schemes than under 
DB schemes, but it is not obvious whether retirement will be earlier or later on 
average.  Two recent US studies (Munnell et al, 2003, and Friedberg and Webb, 
2005) have found that DC plans have seen people delaying retirement by one or two 
years compared to DB schemes.  In the UK, a number of factors are likely to be 
critical, including the following: 
•  Early retirement incentives in DB schemes.  Compared to DB schemes 
that offer very generous early retirement opportunities, DC schemes are likely 
to result in later retirement.  But, the same demographic and financial factors 
that underlie the shift from DB to DC are likely to put pressure on early 
retirement incentives in DB schemes.   
                                                 
29 See Friedberg and Webb (2005) and Smith (2005) for further discussion 
30 Annuity rates rise with age to compensate for the fact that someone will receive an annuity 
for one less year.  But the value of the annuity (ie the expected present discounted value of the 
annuity stream) typically falls with age for the average annuitant because of selection in the 
annuity market (ie the fact that longer-lived individuals tend to annuitize later) – see 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004).  Thus, for the average annuitant, there is a penalty to 
delaying annuitization because the value of the annuity declines with age. 
31 There is a loss because of mortality risk as well as discounting of future income.   17
•  Accumulation of funds in DC schemes.  Contribution rates into DC 
pensions are often lower than those in the DB schemes they replace;32 if final 
pension wealth is also lower then this is likely to mean later retirement.  
Again, this retirement effect may not be a direct result of the shift from DB to 
DC, but reflect the underlying demographic and financial factors that are 
putting pension schemes under pressure. 
•  Investment portfolios within DC funds.  The incentive to delay 
retirement in a DC scheme comes from the fact that someone can continue to 
increase the value of their pension by getting another year’s return on the 
accumulated fund.  Shifting into safer assets in the run-up to retirement will 
reduce the size of the return – and the incentive to delay retirement.  By 
remaining in equities, the average return is likely to be higher, but changes in 
the equity prices may have big positive or negative wealth effects on 
retirement (see Gardner and Orszag, 2003, and Coile and Levine, 2004). 
As well as possible effects on the timing of retirement, there is also a potential impact 
on the nature of retirement.  DC pensions are more flexible than traditional DB 
occupational schemes and better able to accommodate a more diverse range of 
retirement behaviour.  Since the majority of accrual at older ages comes from the 
return on the fund, rather than additional contributions, there is potentially a greater 
separation between the decision to work and the decision to draw a pension.  One 
implication of this is that there is no longer such a strong penalty for part-time 
working.     
IV. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING RETIREMENT 
Mandatory retirement 
Economic models typically treat retirement as a choice variable, albeit a choice that is 
made subject to the potential constraints of employment opportunities and pension 
arrangements.  However, there is a range of factors that may force people into early 
retirement.   
One of these is mandatory retirement, still legal in the UK, but due to be abolished 
before age 65 from October 2006 following a European Commission Directive.  In 
addition, from this date, all employees will have the right to request working beyond 
age 65 and age discrimination in recruitment, promotion and training will be banned.   
                                                 
32 Contribution rates are not directly comparable because of the different way wealth builds 
up in the two schemes.     18
There is considerable evidence on the effect of banning mandatory retirement in the 
US where mandatory retirement was prohibited before age 65 from 1967, prohibited 
before age 70 from 1978 and abolished altogether in 1986.  Individual states chose to 
raise or abolish mandatory retirement ages ahead of the federal government, and 
differences over time and across states have been used to identify the effect of 
abolition.  A number of studies have found that abolishing mandatory retirement 
raised employment among older workers – Neumark and Stock (1999), for example, 
found that abolition raised employment rates among affected older workers by as 
much as seven percentage points. 
According to Lazear (1979), mandatory retirement has an important role to play as 
part of a long-term employment contract between employers and employees; it 
ensures that workers leave the firm when they have been paid the value of their 
lifetime labour.  In Lazear’s model, younger workers are paid less than their 
productivity and part of their remuneration is delayed to encourage retention and 
effort.  The flipside of this is that they are paid more than their marginal product 
when they are older and so, to ensure that workers leave the firm, the employer must 
be able to force retirement once the employee has been paid the full value of their 
lifetime productivity. 33  According to this argument, the abolition of mandatory 
retirement could weaken long-term labour contracts, and the efficiency of the firm.  
However, Neumark and Stock (1999) found that wage profiles were actually steeper 
following the abolition of mandatory retirement, rather than flatter.  They suggested 
that the abolition of mandatory retirement actually strengthened long-term 
contracts, since workers would no longer fear being forced to retire before they had 
been paid their lifetime value.   
The desirability of mandatory retirement in the Lazear model assumes two things.  
One is that employers and employees want long-term employment contracts, 
something that may be less the case today than it was twenty-five years ago when 
Lazear’s article was first published.  The other is that rising earnings among older 
workers do not reflect increased productivity.  
The issue of the age-profile of productivity for older workers is therefore a key one, 
although it is an area where there is relatively little evidence to date. Meadows (2003) 
summarizes an interesting collection of findings indicating that:  
                                                 
33 Plus a risk premium.   19
•  There may be positive effects of experience, interpersonal skills and 
motivation that counteract the adverse effects of loss of speed, strength and 
memory. 
•  Where performance does decline, it is driven by rapid deterioration among a 
small number of individual rather than a general decline across the cohort 
(scores among older workers are more dispersed than those among younger 
workers). 
It is not clear therefore, that employers require mandatory retirement to force out 
workers whose productivity is falling relative to their wages.  There may, therefore, be 
little reason not to abolish early mandatory retirement, but the evidence from the UK 
suggests that the effect on employment is likely to be quite small.  Firstly, 
employment rates among older workers are typically lower than they were in the US 
when mandatory retirement was abolished. Second, relatively few people appear to 
be genuinely constrained by mandatory early retirement ages.34  
A variety of data from the BHPS and ELSA can be used to produce rough estimates of 
the number of people who are likely to be affected when mandatory retirement ages 
below age 65 are abolished from October 2006. Looking backwards, around one-
third of the BHPS sample say that they feel that retirement was something that they 
were forced into, rather than being voluntary, but mandatory early retirement ages 
do not appear to be the main factor behind forced retirements.  Around half the 
BHPS sample (60% of men) report that they have a fixed retirement age in their job,35 
although for most men this age is 65 or greater and so will not be affected in October 
2006.  Only around 1.5% of retirements appear to be attributable to mandatory 
retirement ages below 65. 36  
The second wave of ELSA, collected in 2004, contains questions about mandatory 
retirement in individuals’ jobs, in addition to the data on normal retirement ages in 
pension schemes. Across the whole working population aged 52 and over in 2004, 
40% were employed in jobs in which there was a mandatory retirement age, of which 
fewer than one in five faced a mandatory retirement age of less than 65. Employees 
are also asked whether they would like to retire later, were they to be given the 
opportunity by their employer. Only 22% reported that they would like to work past 
the mandatory retirement age if given the opportunity although this fraction is higher 
                                                 
34 The abolition of the earnings test for receipt of state pension income was found to have a 
small positive effect on average hours worked (see Disney and Smith, 2002). 
35 These figures are also likely to overstate the extent to which there are mandatory retirement 
ages since people may just be referring to normal retirement ages in their occupational 
pension schemes.   
36 This evidence is in line with Meadows (2003) who also found a limited number of cases 
where early retirement could be directly attributable to mandatory early retirement.   20
(36%) if one excludes those whose mandatory retirement age is 65 or more. Taken 
together this suggests that around 2.6% of employees would have retirement 
constraints removed by the 2006 reform.  
This evidence suggests that there may only be a small direct effect of abolishing 
mandatory early retirement on the employment of older workers.  Even without 
mandatory retirement, employers will still be able to affect when workers leave the 
firm – most obviously where they offer a defined benefit pension scheme which can 
be structured to provide strong incentives to retire at a particular age, but also 
through greater flexibility in wages, linked perhaps to performance monitoring.37  
However, there may be a greater effect from the wider government initiatives aimed 
at promoting employment among older workers.38  
Ill-health 
Ill-health appears to play a far greater role than mandatory early retirement in 
explaining why people feel forced into retirement.  Table 6 shows that, overall, 
around one-quarter of the sample gave ill-health as the main reason for early 
retirement; when early retirement was forced, this proportion rose to over half. These 
numbers are very similar numbers to those found using ELSA data (see Banks and 
Casanova (2004) who instead distinguish the analysis by whether individuals retired 
before or at/after the SPA).   
                                                 
37 Ashenfelter and Card (2002) show quite strong effects of the abolition of mandatory 
retirement among academics all of whom have a defined contribution pension scheme. 
38 For example, the Age Positive campaign, http://www.agepositive.gov.uk/    21
Table 5: Main reason for early retirement, according to whether 
retirement was wanted or forced 
  Men  Women 
  All  Wanted  Forced  All  Wanted  Forced 
Own ill-health  28.8%  9.2%  56.3%  24.8%  11.4%  45.5% 
Others’ ill-health  4.1%  2.3%  3.8%  10.2%  5.1%  17.6% 
Redundancy/ 
compulsory 
19.1%  10.0%  28.2%  12.1%  5.9%  20.6% 
Financial deal  25.3%  42.3%  4.7%  7.3%  11.8%  1.2% 
Spend more time 
with family 
3.4%  5.8%  0.0%  13.2%  21.7%  1.8% 
Enjoy life while 
young & fit 
8.7%  16.5%  0.5%  9.7%  16.1%  1.8% 
Same time as 
partner 
0.2%  0.0%  0.5%  6.7%  11.0%  1.2% 
Other  10.4%  13.9%  6.0%  16.0%  17.1%  10.3% 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 2001 
 
Of course, there are a number of problems with these subjective data on reasons for 
retirement – there may be a degree of post-hoc rationalisation and reported ill-health 
may be linked to receipt of disability and other ill-health benefits.  Nevertheless, 
other evidence supports a link between ill-health and retirement.  Figure 4 below 
shows that the proportion of people reporting that their health limits their daily 
activities39 increases sharply in the years immediately before people are observed 
stopping work.  Interestingly, there is a slight increase in the proportion reporting 
problems with their health five years before stopping work, which coincides with the 
biggest reduction in average weekly hours and the increase in the proportion of 
people working part-time.  Using BHPS data, Disney et al (2002) instrument the 
(endogenous and noisy) self-reported health variable by a constructed ‘health stock’ 
measure using a set of health indicator variables and personal characteristics. They 
show that adverse individual shocks to health stocks are a significant predictor of 
individual retirement behaviour among workers aged 50 and over.  
                                                 
39 This variable is not present in wave 9 of the BHPS, but a value can be imputed on the basis 
of individuals’ responses in waves 8 and 10.  For individuals who report the same values in 
wave 8 and 10 this is fairly straightforward.  Where there is a change between waves 8 and 10, 
the individual is assigned the value in wave 10 (where available), and otherwise the value in 
wave 8.  It makes no difference to the results if, instead, the individual is assigned the value in 
wave 8 where available and wave 10 otherwise   22












































































Graphs by sex 
 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2003 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has shown how the timing and nature of retirement in the UK have been 
influenced by the institutional context within which people make retirement 
decisions. 
•  The dominant pattern for men is one of voluntary, early retirement onto a 
private pension straight from (full-time) employment.  But this pattern is 
more characteristic of those with higher qualifications and/or an occupational 
pension. 
•  Employer defined benefit schemes have encouraged people to stay in work 
until the normal/ early retirement age, and then to retire early across a fairly 
narrow range of ages that are typically before the State Pension Age.  
Increased coverage of occupational pensions and generous early retirement 
incentives undoubtedly contributed to the decline in economic activity among 
older workers.  Today, coverage of occupational pensions is falling and with 
many schemes running deficits, there is far less scope for employers to offer 
generous early retirement opportunities.         
•  Occupational pensions have also imposed constraints on gradual retirement, 
while people continue to belong to their employers’ scheme.  The fact that 
pension depends on final salary, together with legal constraints on working   23
and drawing a pension from the same employer have restricted people’s 
opportunity to reduce their hours.  But, without a private pension (or other 
financial wealth), the possibility of gradual retirement and part-time work 
before the state pension age is even less likely.   
•  Among those with no qualifications and/or occupational pension, very few 
work until the state pension age and, before this age, use income support and, 
more commonly, disability benefits as alternative early retirement vehicles.  
Levels of non-work are high, even among those in their 40s and 50s, and 
‘retirement’ is typically via another non-working state (unemployment or 
long-term illness/ disability). 
The analysis has also yielded the following insights, which are likely to be relevant for 
the government as it considers possible ways of encouraging later retirement: 
•  7% of men stop working at 65 and draw only a state pension at this age.  
Raising the state pension age may therefore have a limited direct effect on 
retirement, although there may be a wider impact through raising normal and 
early retirement ages in employer schemes (and changing social norms).  On 
the other hand, there may be “leakage” through alternative early retirement 
vehicles, particularly disability benefits.   
•  There may be very little case for employers being allowed to set mandatory 
retirement ages, but abolishing mandatory retirement is also likely to have a 
limited direct effect on raising employment among older workers and 
delaying retirement.  The evidence suggests that few workers retire early as a 
direct result of a mandatory retirement age.  However, there may be a bigger 
impact through the government’s wider initiative to encourage employment of 
older workers and the ban on age discrimination. 
•  The shift from DB to DC schemes will change individuals’ retirement 
incentives.  The age profile of retirements is likely to be smoother with DC 
pensions, but what is less clear is whether on average, retirement will be 
earlier or later: DC schemes have less strong incentives to retire after 
normal/early retirement ages, but less strong incentives to work up to those 
ages.  Key factors affecting the timing of retirement in DC schemes compared 
to DB schemes include – what happens to opportunities for early retirement 
in DB schemes, the size of funds that people build up in DC schemes and their 
investment strategies (and asset returns) in the run-up to retirement.       24
•  DC pensions will mean more flexibility (allowing more opportunity for 
gradual retirement and a greater separation of the work decision from the 
pension decision), but also possibly more uncertainty about pension value, 
and the timing of retirement. 
•  The complex and interdependent relationship between health and retirement 
is not yet fully understood, but health shocks undoubtedly play an important 
role in forcing people to retire early, possibly before they anticipated or 
wanted to.  Ill-health will act as a constraint on raising effective retirement 
age and the government faces a challenge in providing support to those who 
genuinely need some form of disability insurance while restricting its use as 
an early retirement vehicle.40 
•  Much of the debate in the media has been about raising the state pension age 
from 65 to 67, but the evidence suggests that the real challenge in extending 
working lives is to reduce non-employment among (particularly low-
qualified) 40 to 60 year-olds. As the demographic trends continue, and the 
economy experiences a relative substitution of older (potential) workers for 
younger workers, understanding the labour demand for such older workers 
may prove to be as important as understanding the labour supply when it 
comes to forecasting the way in which economies around the world will adjust 
to population ageing. 
                                                 
40 The 1995 reforms which replaced invalidity benefit with incapacity benefit reduced the 
number of claimants above state pension age.  The number of total claimants in their 50s 
continued to grow, although for men the number of claimants remained fairly constant.(see 
Disney and Hawkes, 2003).  Econometric analysis by Disney et al (2004) finds no evidence of 
a reduction in economic inactivity among older workers that can be attributable to the 
reforms.   25
Annex: Data from the British Household Panel Survey 
The data used to analyze retirements are taken from waves 1-13 of the British 
Household Panel Survey.  This panel dataset has been collecting information on the 
same sample of approximately 10,000 individuals each year since 1991.  The analysis 
uses a selected sub-sample of men and women aged 40 – 80 in each wave.  Since the 
BHPS covers all ages, it has a smaller number of individuals in the relevant age range 
for studying retirement than, for example, the US Health and Retirement Survey and 
the new English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA).  Nevertheless, there is a 
reasonable-sized sample of around 1,500 retirements over the entire period and a 
wide number of variables, including some summary information on spending, well-
being and health as well as the detailed income information in each wave.  One of the 
main strengths of the BHPS is that, with up to thirteen waves of information on each 
individual, it affords quite detailed analysis of dynamics of retirement transitions.  
Moreover, in wave 11, a special module collected information on ageing and 
retirement that was designed to be directly comparable with the questions collected 
in the more specialist ELSA questionnaire.      
The definitions of “retirement” exploit the panel aspect of the BHPS data as follows: 
•  Self-assessed retirement is defined as the first time someone reports that 
their employment status is retired.  In the BHPS someone cannot be 
simultaneously working and retired since these are mutually exclusive 
categories.  In other British retirement surveys, such as the UK Retirement 
Survey (see Tanner, 1998) and ELSA (see Banks and Casanova, 2004) 
retirement status is asked independently of employment status, so that 
someone can be retired and working. 
•  Stopping work is defined as the last time that someone is observed to leave 
employment.  Clearly, this definition potentially suffers from the fact that the 
data are right-censored. 
•  Pension receipt is defined as the first period in which someone is observed 
to receive an income from a pension (from a former employer, a private 
pension/ annuity, an NI pension, or a widow’s pension). 
   26
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